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The role of internationalinstitutionshas been central to the study of world politicsat
least since the conclusionof World War II. Much of this research was, and continues
to be, pioneered in the pages of International Organization. In this article we take
stock of past work on internationalinstitutions,trace the evolutionof major themes
in scholarship over time, and highlightareas for productive new research. Our cen-
tral argumentis that research should increasinglyturn to the questionof how institu-
tions matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in world politics. New re-
search efforts should emphasize observable implications of alternative theories of
institutions.We advocateapproachinginternationalinstitutionsas both the object of
strategicchoiceand a constraint on actors’behavior,an idea that is familiar to schol-
ars of domestic institutions but has been neglected in much of the debate between
realist and institutionalistscholars of internationalrelations.
The article is organized into three major sections. The ￿ rst section provides an
analytical review of the development of studies of international institutions. From
the beginning,the pages of IO have been ￿ lled with insightfulstudiesof institutions,
in some cases asking questions consistent with the research agenda we propose in
this essay. But the lack of a disciplinary foundation in the early years meant that
many good insights were simply lost, not integrated into other scholars’ research.
With the professionalization of the discipline since the late 1950s, scholarship on
internationalinstitutionshas become more theoreticallyinformed, and empirical re-
search has begun more often to conform to social-scienti￿c standards of evidence,
with results that provide both caution and inspiration for future research. One of the
most consequentialdevelopmentsfor our understandingof internationalinstitutions
came in the early 1970s, when a new generation of scholars developed insights that
openedupinquirybeyondthatof formal organizations,providingintellectualbridge-
heads to the study of institutionsmore generally.
Our thanks for comments on previous versions go to Marc Busch, Peter Katzenstein, Bob Keohane,
Steve Krasner, and participants in the IO ￿ftieth anniversary issue conference.
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r 1998 by The IO Foundationand the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnologyThe second section explicitly addresses a theme that arises from the review of
scholarship on institutions: whether international politics needs to be treated as sui
generis, with its own theories and approaches that are distinct from other ￿ elds of
politicalscience,or whetherit fruitfullycan drawontheoriesof domesticpolitics.As
our review shows, developments in studies of American politics, such as studies of
voting and coalitional behavior, have often in￿uenced the way that scholars ap-
proached international institutions.Most of these efforts did not pay off with major
insights.The functionalistapproachto institutionsadoptedinthe1980sowed littleto
theories of domestic politics,drawing more on economic models. Today, we see the
pendulum swinging back, as more scholars turn to modern theories initially devel-
opedtostudydomesticpoliticalphenomena(see HelenMilner’s articlein thisissue).
Here, we assess whetherthesenewattemptsare likelyto be anymore successfulthan
previousefforts.
The third section turns to the problem of research agendas. Where does scholar-
ship on international institutions go next? Our primary argument in this section is
that attentionneeds to focus on how, not just whether, internationalinstitutionsmat-
ter for world politics. Too often over the last decade and a half the focal point of
debate has been crudely dichotomous:institutionsmatter, or they do not. This shap-
ing of the agenda has obscured more productive and interesting questions about
variation in the types and degree of institutionaleffects, variations that were in fact
well documentedin the less theoretical but well-researched case studies of the jour-
nal’s earliest years. Of course, we do not suggest a return to idiographicinstitutional
analysis.Rather, we suggesta numberof lines of theoreticallyinformed analysisthat
may lead to research that both asks better questionsand is more subject to empirical
testing. These paths include more serious analysis of the distributional effects of
institutions,the relation between internationalinstitutionsand domestic politics,the
problem of unanticipatedconsequences,and a typologyof institutionaleffects.
The Evolution of an Idea:
Institutions in International Politics
Early Studies of the Institutionalizationof the Postwar World
The ‘‘poles’’ofrealism andidealism—ofwhichmuchismadeingraduateseminars—
had little to do with the highly practical organizational analysis that dominated the
pages of IO in the ￿ rst decadesafter the war. The focus of attentionwas on how well
these newly established institutions met the problems that they were designed to
solve. On this score, few scholarly accounts were overly optimistic. Overwhelmed
by the magnitude of the political and economic reconstruction effort, few judged
postwar organizationsas up to the task. Central to this debate was a highly realistic
understanding that international politics would shape and limit the effectiveness of
postwar institutions; virtually no one predicted that these would triumph over poli-
730 InternationalOrganizationtics. The UN,1 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),2 the Interna-
tionalMonetaryFund3 —all were the subjectof highlycritical review.
Anumberof importantstudiesgrappledexplicitlywith the impact of these institu-
tions on the policies of the major powers and the outcomes for the central political
andmilitarycompetitionbetween them.The answers, predictably,were derivedfrom
littlemore than informedcounterfactualreasoning,buttheydisplayeda sensitivityto
the broad range of possible impacts that institutionssuch as the League and the UN
could have on the major powers. In their examinationof the ideal of collectivesecu-
rity, Howard C. Johnson and Gerhart Niemeyer squarely inquired into the role that
norms, backed by organizations such as the UN, play in affecting states’ behavior.
They asked whether states were ‘‘prepared to use force or the threat of force for the
sake of public law and order rather than for the sake of their national advantage in
relation to that of other states. . . . How has the behavior of states been affected by
thesestandards?’’4 Thoughultimatelymore con￿dent inthebalanceof power than in
norms embodied in the rule of law, these scholars were correct to push for a mecha-
nism that might explain the effects of institutionson behavior: ‘‘We cannot claim to
have learned much about the League experiment until we know how it has affected
the problem of harnessing and controlling the factors of force and their role in the
relationsof power.’’5
A ￿ urry of studies in the early 1950s suggested possible answers. Pointing to the
U.S. role in decolonization and military aid for Korea, collective institutions were
said to raise U.S. ‘‘consciousness of broader issues’’ that might affect American
interests and thereby make the U.S. more responsive to world opinion.6 By subject-
ing policies to global scrutiny—a mechanism not unlike those of transparency and
reputation central to the literature in the 1980s—the UN was viewed as having had
an (admittedlymarginal) effect on some of the most central issues of world politics.
Thoughlacking the elaboratetheoreticalapparatusof current research, early stud-
ies ofpostwarorganizationshadmanyofthesame insightsthathaveinformed‘‘mod-
ern’’institutionalism.Parallelingmuch contemporaryargumenton theform of coop-
eration,7 one study as early as 1949 argued that multilateralism was precluded in
cases where there were signi￿cant bargaining advantagesand discriminationadvan-
tagesofproceedingbilaterally.8Foreshadowingmoretheoreticallysophisticatedtreat-
ments of informal versus formal agreements,9 studies of GATT as early as 1954
recognized that some agreements gain strength through their informal nature, and
1. See Goodrich 1947, 18; Fox 1951; Hoffmann 1956; Claude 1963; and Malin 1947. But for the
optimisticview, see Bloom￿eld 1960.
2. Gorter 1954.
3. See Knorr1948;and Kindleberger 1951a.
4. Johnsonand Niemeyer 1954,27.
5. Niemeyer 1952,558(italics added).
6. Cohen 1951. Fora parallel analysis of institutionaleffects on Soviet behavior,see Rudzinski1951.
7. See Oye 1992;and Martin 1992b.
8. Little1949.
9. Lipson 1991.
InternationalInstitutions 731prescient of the regimes literature viewed the value of GATT as ‘‘a focal point on
which many divergent views on appropriate commercial policy converge.’’10 Lack-
inga theoreticalhookonwhich tohang theseobservations,and withouta profession-
alized critical mass of scholars to develop these insights, many important ￿ ndings
were only rediscovered and advancedmore than two decades later.
Nowhere is this more true than in the rediscovery of the relationship between
international institutions and domestic politics. The idea that international institu-
tions can in￿ uence state behavior by acting through domestic politicalchannels was
recognized by scholars writing in the mid-1950s. Referring to the example of the
International Finance Corporation, B. E. Matecki wrote that internationalorganiza-
tions could be ‘‘idea generating centers’’ with the ability to set in motion national
forces thatdirectlyin￿uencethemakingof nationalpolicy.11 Re￿ ectingontheefforts
of the Council of Europe to gain acceptance of its vision for Europe in national
capitals, an early study by A. Glenn Mowers pointed out the conscious strategy of
direct lobbying of national governments through national parliaments.12 And in a
fascinating study of the role of the Security Council in in￿uencing Dutch colonial
policy,WhitneyPerkinspointedtothecrucialinteractionbetweenauthoritativeinter-
nationaldecisionsand democraticpolitics:‘‘By de￿ance of the Security Council the
Dutch alerted powerful monitors who allied their strength with domestic forces in
requiring them to live up to principles [of decolonization].’’13 ‘‘In this type of inter-
action between democratic governments and the UN emerge some of the essential
elements of a world political process.’’14 Anticipatinga mechanism for institutional
effectsthathaverecentlyresurfaced incontemporarystudies,he concludedthat‘‘The
role ofthe UN is to exertpressures designedtoenabletheloserinpublicsentimentto
accept the consequences of its loss.’’15 This research approach re￿ ected an effort to
￿ esh out the mechanisms by which the policies and perspectives of international
institutionscouldwork throughnationalpolitics.
In short, the early postwar literature on international institutions, while highly
focused on formal organizations, was far less naive and legalistic, more politically
sensitiveand insightfulthan it is often given credit for being.Early insightsincluded
therecognitionthatthenatureoftheinternationalpoliticalsystemprovideda context
fortheeffectivenessofinternationalinstitutions,thatinstitutionaleffectivenessshould
be subject to empirical investigation, and that elaborate organizational structure is
not always the best approach to achieving international cooperation. Moreover, the
best of this early literature was concerned not merely with whether international
institutions had an impact, but how one might think about a mechanism for their
effects. Transparency, reputation, and legitimacy as well as domestic political pres-
sures were suggested in various strands of thought. But there was no conceptual
10. Gorter 1954,1, 8.
11. Matecki 1956.
12. Mowers 1964.
13. Perkins1958,40.
14. Ibid.,26.
15. Ibid.,42
732 InternationalOrganizationframework thatcouldtietheseinsightstogether;norwas therea systematiccompara-
tive enterprise to check for their regularity. Rather, another research agenda, replete
with fancy methodological tools imported from American politics, was to demote
these questionsin favor of an only partially fruitful examinationof the internal poli-
tics of internationalorganizations.
The In￿uence of Behavioralism:
Politics Within InternationalInstitutions
If few thought international organization would liberate the world from politics, it
arguably became important to understand who has power in these organizationsand
how that power was being exercised. Especially since the use of the veto had appar-
entlyrendered theSecurityCounciltoothless,concernbegantofocus onthedevelop-
ment of rules and norms in the General Assembly. The supposed ‘‘specter’’ of bloc
voting in that forum—increasinglyof concern toAmerican scholars and policymak-
ers as the ColdWar extendedits gelid reach—became a central concern.16
This debate took what appears today to be an odd early direction. Perhaps due to
new and exciting work in U.S. legislative behavior, the research program quickly
became focused on how to describe patterns of voting in the General Assembly,
without a systematic attempt to sort out the usefulness of the voting behavior ap-
proach. Despite warnings that the international system was fundamentally different
from domestic political systems,17 this research program easily accepted that voting
in the UN was a proxy for power in that institution. Certainly there were skeptics:
Rupert Emerson and Inis L. Claude,for example,cautionedthat votingin an interna-
tional body does not have the same function as in a democratically elected parlia-
ment; an international conference is a negotiating rather than a legislative body.
Voting in such a situation, they noted, was unlikelyto play a deliberativerole, since
such votes were no more than propaganda efforts.18 Few of these studies explicitly
defended their assumption that General Assembly resolutions somehow mattered to
the conduct of world politics. But the fascination with the method for analyzing
voting behavior overcame fairly readily the caution that the domestic–international
logic should be subject to close scrutiny. Moreover,the hope of providingan explic-
itly political(legislative)model inspiredbyAmerican politicsmay have been a reac-
tion againstthe overly ‘‘anarchic’’systems analysisof the late 1950s.19
Much of thiswork can be traced directlytodevelopmentsin thestudyofAmerican
politics.HaywardAlker and Bruce Russett’s study InternationalPoliticsin the Gen-
16. For one of the earliest studies of bloc voting,see Ball 1951. For a study focusing primarily on the
behavior of the Commonwealth countries, see Carter 1950. Concern with the in￿ uence of the Common-
wealth grew as former British colonies gained independence and membership in the early 1960s. See
Millar1962.
17. Hoffmann 1960,1–4.
18. Emerson and Claude 1952.See also Jebb 1952.
19. Alker and Russett 1965,145,explicitly refer to Liska 1957and Kaplan 1957.They argue that ‘‘[i]t
is simply erroneous to think of international politics as anarchic, chaotic, and utterly unlike national
politics.’’Alker and Russett 1965,147.
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processbyRobertDahl,Duncan Macrae,20 andDavidTrumanwere theoreticallyand
methodologicallysuggestiveof ways in which roll-call data could be used to test for
theexistenceof apluralisticpoliticalprocessina quasi-legislativeinternationalorga-
nization.’’21 In￿ uenced by James March22 and Robert Dahl, this study sought to
understandvariousin￿uenceson UN votingbehavioracross issue areas in which the
dimensions of power and in￿uence were likely to differ. Certainly, one factor in￿u-
encing this research agenda was the priority given to reproducible and ‘‘objective’’
forms of social science;the focus on GeneralAssembly voting was acknowledgedto
be an artifact of the availabilityof fairly complete votingrecords.23
Largely related to the ferment in American voting studies, politics within the UN
dominated the research agenda for most of the decade from the mid-1960s. Central
was the concern to explain why certain countries had a tendencyto vote together, to
voteinblocs,ortoform ‘‘legislativecoalitions.’’24AlsoobviouslyinspiredbyAmeri-
can politics, another branch of inquiry focused on the determinants of successfully
runningfor electiveUN office.25 Much of this literature was methodologicallyrather
than conceptually driven and highly inductive with respect to its major empirical
￿ ndings.26 Little effort was made to explorethe extent to which the conceptof repre-
sentation or the winning of elections in the domestic setting could travel meaning-
fully toan internationalinstitution.The research programloststeam underheavy￿ re
from scholars who demanded a stronger justi￿cation for focusing on the General
Assembly as a microcosm for world politics.27
Partially in response to the critique that the General Assembly was hardly the
center of world politics, and partially in￿uenced by another trend in American poli-
tics growing out of the study of bureaucratic politics and political systems, another
research pathwas taken byRobertCox andHarold Jacobson’s studyofeightspecial-
ized agencieswithin the UN.28 In their editedvolume, the focus was on the structure
and process of in￿uence associated with these institutions and their outputs, rather
than on their formal character. Re￿ecting once again a major thread in American
politics, the underlying assumption was that international organizations could be
fruitfully analyzed as distinct politicalsystems in which one could trace out patterns
of in￿uence: ‘‘The legal and formal character and the content of the decision is less
importantthan the balanceof forces that it expresses and the inclinationthat it gives
to the further directionof events.’’29
20. MacRae 1958.
21. Alker and Russett 1965,vii.
22. March 1955.
23. On objectivity,see Alker and Russett 1965,2–3; on availability of data see p. 19.
24. See Riggs 1958; Hovet 1958; Keohane 1967, 1969;Weigert and Riggs 1969; Gareau 1970;Alker
1970;Volgy1973;and Harbert 1976.
25. See Volgy and Quistgard 1974;and Singer and Sensenig 1963.
26. See, for example, Rieselbach 1960.
27. For two systematic reviews of the quantitativeresearch on the UN and international organizations,
see Riggs et al. 1970;andAlger 1970.
28. Cox and Jacobson 1973.
29. Ibid.
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zations to consider a more transgovernmental model of their in￿uences. Whereas
other research inspired by behavioralismtypically assumed a uni￿ ed model of state
interests and actors, this work focused on transgovernmental coalitions involving
parts of governmentsandpartsofinternationalorganizations.One ofthemost impor-
tant insightsgeneratedwas highlyconsonantwith developmentsin transgovernmen-
tal relations that had come on the intellectual scene in the 1970s:30 the observation
that onechannelthroughwhichinternationalorganizationscouldaffect state policies
was throughthe potentialalliancesthat could form between internationalbureaucra-
cies and domesticpressure groups at the nationallevel.31 Althoughthis was an inter-
esting insight, and case studies tended to con￿rm the importance of such ‘‘transna-
tionalcoalitions’’forpolicyimplementation,theireffectonpolicyformulationremains
unclear.32 Meanwhile, the issues facing the internationalcommunity changed drasti-
cally in the early 1970s, giving rise to a new approach to the study of international
institutions,discussed in the followingsection.
Finally,a strand of research stimulated by Ernst Haas’s ‘‘neofunctionalapproach’’
to integrationalso left a tellingmark onthestudyofempiricaleffects of international
institutions in the 1970s. Neofunctionalism ascribed a dynamic role to individuals
and interestgroups in theprocessof integratingpluralistcommunities.33 By virtue of
their participationin the policymakingprocess of an integratingcommunity,interest
groups and other participants were hypothesized to ‘‘learn’’ about the rewards of
such involvement and undergo attitudinalchanges inclining them favorably toward
theintegrativesystem.AccordingtoHaas,‘‘politicalintegrationistheprocesswhereby
actors shift their loyalties,expectations,and politicalactivitiestoward a new center,
whose institutionspossessor demandjurisdictionoverpreexistingnationalstates.’’34
The implications for empirical research on such institutions were readily drawn:
those who participate in international organizations should exhibit altered attitudes
toward their usefulnessand effectiveness.
American politicsprovidedyet anothermethodologicalinstrumentthatdovetailed
nicely with what was thought to be an empirically testable proposition of Haas’s
theory: survey research! From the late 1950s into the early 1980s, a plethora of
studiestriedtoestablishwhetherinternationalorganizationscouldcontributeto‘‘learn-
ing,’’ whether cognitive or affective.35 The attitudes of civil servants,36 political ap-
pointees,and even nationallegislators37 were scrutinizedfor evidencethat the length
or nature of their association with various kinds of international organizations had
inducedattitudinalchange.The impact of methodsfromAmerican politicswas obvi-
30. Keohane and Nye 1974.
31. See Cox 1969, 225;and Cox and Jacobson 1973,214.
32. See, for example, Russell 1973;and Keohane 1978.
33. See Haas 1958;and Pentland1973.
34. Haas 1958,10.
35. See Kelman 1962; Alger 1965; and Jacobson 1967. See also Wolf 1974, 352–53; and Volgy and
Quistgard 1975.
36. See Ernst 1978;and Peck 1979.
37. See Bonham1970;Kerr 1973;Riggs1977;and Karns 1977.
InternationalInstitutions 735ous: in some cases, indicators were used that precisely paralleled the ‘‘thermom-
eters’’used by the NationalOpinion Survey Research project.
Three problems bedeviled this research approach for years. First, it failed to pro-
duce consensus on the effect of internationalinstitutionson attitudes.38 Second, atti-
tudes were never reconnectedwith outcomes, policies, or actions.39 Third, research-
ers were never able to overcome the problem of recruitment bias, which itself
accounted for most of the positive attitudes held by personnel associated with inter-
nationalinstitutions.As neofunctionalismas a theoreticalorientationlost favor over
the course of the 1970s and integrativeinternationalorganizationssuch as the Euro-
pean Communityand the UN seemed to stagnate in the face of growing world prob-
lems beyondtheirpurview, thisresearch program declined,thoughtodaya version is
pursued primarily in studies that attempt to document mass attitudes toward the
European Union.
Politics Beyond Formal Organizations:
The Rise of InternationalRegimes
As the study of international institutions progressed over the post–World War II
years, the gulf between internationalpolitics and formal organization arrangements
began to open in ways that were not easy to reconcile. The major internationalcon-
￿ ict for a rising generationof scholars—the VietnamWar—raged beyondthe formal
declarations of the UN. Two decades of predictable monetary relations under the
Bretton Woods institutions were shattered by a unilateral decision by the United
States in 1971 to close the gold window and later to ￿ oat the dollar. The rise of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and their apparent power to upset
previously understoodarrangements with respect to oil pricing and availabilitytook
place outside the structure of traditional internationalorganizations,as did consum-
ers’response later in the decade.For some, the propernormativeresponse seemed to
be to strengthen international organizationsto deal with rising problems of interde-
pendence.40Othersmorefamiliarwiththepublicchoiceliteraturearguedthataproper
extensionofpropertyrights,largelyunderwayinareas suchasenvironmentalprotec-
tion,rather than a formal extensionof supranationalauthorityper se, was the answer
tosolvingproblemsofcollectiveaction.41 Overall,few doubtedthatinternationallife
was ‘‘organized,’’but, increasingly,it became apparentthatmuch oftheearlierfocus
38. Studiesthatfailed tocon￿rm expectationsofattitudinalchangeincludeSiverson1973;andBonham
1970.Afew studieseven foundnegative impacts on attitudesdueto association with internationalorgani-
zations: Smith 1973;and Pendergast 1976.
39. To the extent that such associations affected outcomes, the results were generally innocuous. See,
for example, Mathiason 1972.
40. Brown and Fabian, for example, modestly call for ‘‘a comprehensive ocean authority, an outer
space projects agency, a globalweather and climate organization,and an internationalscienti￿ c commis-
sion on globalresources and technologies.’’See Brown and Fabian 1975.See also Ruggie1972,890,891;
and Gosovic and Ruggie1976.
41. Conybeare 1980.
736 InternationalOrganizationon formal structures and multilateral treaty-based agreements, especially the UN,
had been overdrawn.42
The events of the early 1970s gave rise to the study of ‘‘international regimes,’’
de￿ned as rules, norms, principles,and procedures that focus expectationsregarding
internationalbehavior.Clearly,theregimes movementrepresentedan effort tosubsti-
tute an understandingof internationalorganizationwith an understandingof interna-
tional governancemore broadly.43 It also demoted the study of internationalorgani-
zationsas actors:prior to thestudyofinternationalregimes an inquiryinto theeffects
of internationalinstitutionsmeant inquiringinto how effectively a particularagency
performed its job,for example,theefficiencywith whichtheWorldHealth Organiza-
tion vaccinated the world’s needy children.44 When regimes analysts looked for ef-
fects, these were understood to be outcomes in￿uenced by a constellation of rules
rather than tasks performed by a collectiveinternationalagency.
But just what effects regimes analysis sought to uncover has changed as the re-
search programhasunfolded.45A￿ rst collectiveeffort bythescholarlycommunityto
address regime effects was primarily interested in the distributive consequences of
thenormsof theinternationalfoodregime,arguingthatit isimportanttoconsiderthe
‘‘ways inwhichtheglobalfoodregimeaffects . . . wealth,power, autonomy,commu-
nity, nutritional well-being, . . . and sometimes physical survival.’’46 In this view,
regime‘‘effects’’were tobe reckonedinterms of thedistributiveconsequencesofthe
behaviorof a myriad of producers,distributors,and consumers, and, in a minor way,
by international organizations and state bureaucracies. Certainly, there was in this
early volume little thought that regimes were somehow efficient or efficiency-
improving outcomes, as later theorizing would imply; rather, the food regime was
characterized by ‘‘broad and endemicinadequacies,’’which are the result of national
policiesthatare ‘‘internationallybargainedandcoordinated.. . bymultilateralagree-
ment or unilateraldictate.’’47
Furtherresearch oninternationalregimes moved thinkingin threeimportantdirec-
tions. First, distributive consequences soon fell from the center of consideration as
research began to focus on how internationalregimes are created and transformed in
the ￿ rst place as well as the behavioralconsequencesof norms or rules,48 rather than
the distributive consequences of behavior itself. (We argue later that attention to
distributiveissuesoughttobe restored.)Second,inone(thoughnotdominant)strand
42. On skepticism regarding the centrality of the GATT regime, see Strange 1988. On the declining
importance of‘‘publicinternationalagencies’’in general and the FAO in particular, see McLin 1979.
43. See, for example, Hopkinsand Puchala 1978,especially 598.
44. Hoole 1977. The focus on international organizations as actors providing collective or redistribu-
tive goods has a long history. See Kindleberger 1951a;Ascher 1952; Wood 1952; Loveday 1953; Sharp
1953;and Gregg 1966.
45. We focus here on effects of international regimes because, as argued later, we think this is the
question on which future research should concentrate. For a review of theories that purport to explain
internationalregimes, see Haggard and Simmons1987.
46. Hopkinsand Puchala1978,598.
47. Ibid.,615–16.
48. Krasner 1983b,introductionand conclusion.
InternationalInstitutions 737of research, attention to the normative aspects of internationalregimes led naturally
to considerationof the subjectivemeaning of such norms and to a research paradigm
that was in sympathy with developmentsin constructivistschools of thought.49 (See
the essay by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkinkin this issue of IO.)
Third, by the mid-1980sexplanationsof internationalregimes becameintertwined
with explanations of international cooperation more generally. The work of Robert
Keohane especially drew from functionalist approaches that emphasized the effi-
ciency reasons for rules and agreements among regime participants.50 Based on ra-
tionality assumptions shared by a growing literature in political economy, this re-
search sought to show that international institutions provided a way for states to
overcomeproblemsofcollectiveaction,hightransactioncosts,andinformationde￿-
citsorasymmetries.Thisapproachhas produceda numberof insights,which we will
discuss and extend later. But its analytical bite—derived from its focus on states as
uni￿ed rational actors—was purchased at the expense of earlier insights relating to
transnational coalitions and, especially, domestic politics. Furthermore, the strength
of this approach has largely been its ability to explain the creation and maintenance
of international institutions. It has been weaker in delineating their effects on state
behaviorand other signi￿cant outcomes,an issue to which we will return.
This weakness opened the way for an important realist counterthrust in the late
1980s: the challenge to show that international institutions affect state behavior in
anysigni￿cant way. Some realists,particularlyneorealists,raised logicalandempiri-
cal objections to the institutionalist research agenda. On the logical side, Joseph
Grieco51 and John Mearsheimer argued that relative-gains concerns prevent states
from intensivecooperation.The essenceof theirargumentwas that sincethebene￿ts
of cooperation could be translated into military advantages, states would be fearful
that such bene￿ts would disproportionately ￿ ow to potential adversaries and there-
fore would be reluctant to cooperate in substantial, sustained ways. Responses by
Duncan Snidal and Robert Powell showed that, even if states did put substantial
weight on such relative-gains concerns, the circumstances under which they would
greatly inhibit cooperation were quite limited. Mearsheimer, in his extensive chal-
lenge to institutionalism,also argued that the empirical evidence showing that insti-
tutionschangedpatternsofstatebehaviorwas weak,especiallyinthearea ofsecurity
affairs. While we might disputethe extreme conclusionsdrawn by Mearsheimer, we
take seriously his challengeto provide stronger empirical evidence.In the third sec-
tion of this article we suggest lines of institutionalistanalysisthat should lend them-
selves to rigorous empirical testing, avoiding some of the inferential traps and falla-
cies that Mearsheimer and other realists have identi￿ed.52
49. See Haas 1983;and Ruggie1972.
50. Keohane 1984.
51. See Grieco 1988;and Mearsheimer 1994.
52. See Snidal1991;and Powell 1991.See also Baldwin 1993.
738 InternationalOrganizationInstitutions Across the Level-of-Analysis Divide:
Insights from Domestic Politics
Early studies of international institutions were often motivated by the attempt to
apply new methods used in the study of domestic politics.As just reviewed, studies
of voting behavior in the General Assembly, electoral success in the UN governing
structure,andsurveysregardingattitudinalchangeas a result of internationalorgani-
zation experience are all prime examples. Similar studies continue today, for ex-
ample, in calculationsof power indexes for member states of the European Union.53
These approacheshave not, however, been widely in￿uentialrecentlyand have been
subjecttotrenchantcriticisms.54In spiteofthisless-than-promisingexperience,schol-
ars today are turningonce again to models of domestic politicsto suggestnew ques-
tions and approaches to the study of international institutions. In this section, we
brie￿y considerwhether these new approachesare more likely to bear fruit.
We ￿ nd reasons to be relatively optimistic about today’s attempts to transport
models across levels of analysis, as long as such attempts are undertakenwith some
caution.In particular, we see substantial potentialin lookingat theories of domestic
institutions that are rooted in noncooperative game theory. Rationalist theories of
institutionsthat fall into the category of the ‘‘new institutionalism’’have applicabil-
ity at both the domestic and international levels. Virtually all the early attempts to
apply techniques and research strategies from domestic politics to the international
level were implicitly based on the assumption that agreements among actors are
enforceable. Indeed, this was the only assumptionunder which it made sense to look
at the politics that underlay voting and decision making in international institutions
at all. Models that assume that agreements will be enforced by a neutral third party
are especiallyinappropriatefor the internationalsetting;calculatingvoting power in
theGeneralAssembly in a world of unenforceableagreementsmay have more than a
passingresemblanceto arrangingdeck chairsontheTitanic.Thus,it is notsurprising
that these models have not had great in￿uence when transported to the international
level.
However, recentmodelsof domesticinstitutionsas a rule draw, often explicitly,on
noncooperativegame theory. The basic assumptions of noncooperativegame theory
are that actorsare rational,strategic,and opportunistic,and that no outsideactorwill
step in to enforce agreements. Therefore, agreements that will make a difference
must be self-enforcing.These conditionsare remarkably similar to the usual charac-
terizationof internationalpoliticsas a situationofanarchy and self-help.55As longas
models use the same basic assumptionsabout the nature of actors and their environ-
ment, the potential for learning across the level-of-analysis divide could be enor-
mous.
53. Hosli 1993.
54. Garrett and Tsebelis 1996.
55. Waltz 1979.
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looking at current debates on the nature of legislative institutions.56 Analogously to
how realist theory portraysstates with a mixture of common and con￿ictinginterests
but without supranational enforcement, these models treat legislators as self-
interested, individualistic actors in a situation where they must cooperate with one
anotherto achievemutualbene￿ts.57Theyask howlegislatorsundertheseconditions
might constructinstitutions—such as committeesor parties—that will allowthem to
reach goals such as reelection.58 Similarly, internationalrelations scholars are inter-
ested in how states or other entities design institutionalforms (organizations,proce-
dures, informal cooperativearrangements, treaty arrangements) that assist in the re-
alizationoftheirobjectives.Thepointisnot,asmuchoftheearlierliteratureassumed,
that ‘‘legislativeactivity’’at the internationallevel is interestingper se.The power of
theanalogyrests solelyon how actorschoosestrategiesto copewith similarstrategic
environments.In general,we suggestthatmore progresscanbe made bydrawingout
the aspects of domestic politics that are characterized by attempts to cooperate by
actors with mixed motives, who cannot turn easily to external enforcement, and
applyingthem selectivelyto the studyof internationalrelations.
The debate about legislative organization, which we argue may provide insights
into internationalinstitutionsmore generally,has been roughlyorganizedinto a con-
trast between informationalanddistributionalmodels.Informationalmodelsconcen-
trate on the ways in which legislative structures allow legislators to learn about the
policies they are adopting, thus avoiding inefficient outcomes.59 Researchers have
argued that properlystructuredlegislativecommitteescan efficientlysignalinforma-
tion about the effects of proposed policies to the ￿ oor, and that informational con-
cerns can explain both the pattern of appointment of legislators to committees and
the decision making rules under which committeesoperate.All of these claims have
stimulated intense empirical investigation,which has been challenged by the distri-
butionalperspectivediscussedlater. Informationalmodelscan be used to extend and
clarify arguments in the international literature that stress the role of institutionsin
the provision of information, as Keohane has argued, and in the learning process, as
Ernst andPeter Haas haveemphasized.They can lead to predictionsaboutthecondi-
tions under which international institutions can effectively provide policy-relevant
information to states, about the kinds of institutionsthat can provide credible infor-
mation,andabouttheeffectsofsuchinformationprovisiononpatternsofstatebehav-
ior. An example of an issue area where these effects might be prominent is environ-
56. The work on legislative institutionsis just one example of the application of noncooperativegame
theory to domestic institutions.But since it is a particularlywell-developedliterature, we concentrate on it
here, without wishing to imply that this is the only branch of research on domestic institutions that may
have interesting analogies to internationalinstitutions.
57. ShepsleandWeingast 1995.
58. Although much of the work on legislative organization concentrates on the American context, in
recent years creative efforts have been made to develop such models in non-U.S. settings. See Huber
1996b;Tsebelis and Money 1995;Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; G. Cox 1987; and Shugartand Carey
1992.
59. See Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990;and Krehbiel 1991.
740 InternationalOrganizationmentalinstitutions,where it is highlylikelythattheabilityoforganizationstoprovide
reliable, credible information about the effects of human activities on the environ-
ment is a key factor in explaining the success or failure of negotiationson environ-
mental treaties. Another possible application might be the creation of international
￿ nancialinstitutions,suchas theBankforInternationalSettlements,an originalfunc-
tion of which was to provide credible information to markets on German creditwor-
thiness.60 WithintheEuropeanUnion,theCommission’s role as a relativelyindepen-
dent collectorof policy-relevantinformation is a plausibleexplanationfor its ability
to exercise considerablein￿uence over policy outcomes.61
Distributional models, on the other hand, assume that information is not all that
problematic. Instead, they concentrate on the fact that legislators are heterogeneous
in theirtastes, caring differentiallyaboutvariousissues.62Achievingmutualgains,in
this framework, means cutting deals that will stick across different issues. Since
exchangesof votescannotalwaysbe simultaneous,legislatorshave developedstruc-
tures such as committees and agenda-setting rules that allow them to put together
majoritieson the issuesof most intenseparticularisticinterest to them.Thisstructure
providespredictionsaboutthedistributionofbene￿ tstoindividuallegislators.Distri-
butionalbene￿ts ￿ ow through appointmentto powerful legislativecommittees.Like
researchers in the informational tradition, those in the distributional tradition have
used such models to explain and predict various aspects of legislative organization.
For example, they argue that committees will be composed of preference outliers—
thoselegislatorswho care most intenselyaboutparticularissues—andthatsuchcom-
mittees will be granted agenda-settingpower, which is necessary to keep cross-issue
dealsfrom unravelingon the ￿ oor. Distributionalmodelsmay be especiallyuseful in
exploring in a rigorous fashion the role of internationalinstitutionsin facilitating or
hampering mutually bene￿cial issue linkages that have been an important research
agendain internationalrelations.63
The debatebetween informationaland distributionalmodels of legislativeorgani-
zation has been highly productive, in both theoretical and empirical terms. It has
providednew insightsinto the types of problems confrontedby legislators,the types
of solutions available to them, and the role of institutions in democracies. On the
empirical side, it has generated a plethora of alternativeobservable implications,for
example,aboutthe compositionof congressionalcommitteesor the conditionsunder
which actors gain gatekeeping or amendment power. Empirical research on both
sides has led to deep insights about how the structure of institutions,such as legisla-
tive committees, in￿ uences their ability to help individuals overcome collective-
action problems, and the conditions under which individualswill be willing to del-
egate substantial decision-making authority to such institutions. Both types of
questionsare highly relevant and essential to an understandingof the role of institu-
tions in internationalpoliticsas well. For example,the informationalmodel suggests
60. Simmons1993.
61. See Haas 1989;and Bernauer 1995.
62. Weingast and Marshall 1988.
63. On issue linkage, see Stein 1980;and Martin 1992c.
InternationalInstitutions 741that institutionsshould be most in￿uential in promoting cooperation when they are
relatively independent,‘‘expert’’ sources of information and when such information
is scarce and valuable to states. We should expect this model to be most useful in
internationalissueareas characterizedbyinformationasymmetriesor in thedevelop-
ment of expert knowledge (such as ￿ nancial and banking regulation). The distribu-
tionalmodelpredictsthatinstitutionswill be most successfulinallowingfor credible
cross-issue deals between states when those with the most intense interest in any
particular issue dominate policymaking on that dimension and when institutional
mechanisms inhibit states from reneging on cross-issue deals, even if performance
ondifferentdimensionsisnotsimultaneous.Institutionsthattry tocopewithenviron-
mental protectionand developmentneeds in the same package(such as UNCED and
the Agenda 21 program) provide a plausible example. For our interests, another
striking analogy between the international arena and the legislative literature is the
degreetowhichtheterms ofthedebate—informationversusdistribution—re￿ ect the
emergingdebateaboutthe signi￿cance of internationalinstitutions.
In many essential respects the problems faced by individual legislators mirror
those faced by individual states in the international system. Individual actors face
situations in which they must cooperate in order to achieve bene￿ts but also face
temptationsto defect from cooperativearrangements.No external authorityexists to
enforcecooperativeagreements;they must be self-enforcing.Self-enforcementtakes
the form of exclusion from the bene￿ts of cooperation, a coercive measure. Given
these analogies, there is every reason to expect that some of the methods, insights,
and results of these new studies of legislators could usefully inform new studies of
international institutions, in spite of the fact that legislators (usually) operate in a
more densely institutionalizedenvironment.64 More generally, rationalist models of
institutions that have been developed in domestic settings have the potential to be
translated to the international level. As long as we are considering mixed-motive
situations in which actors must cooperate in order to pursue their objectives, the
incentives to construct institutions to structure and encourage cooperation are
similar.
How Institutions Matter
Since the1980s,work on internationalinstitutionshas been de￿ned for the most part
by the demand that scholars respond to a realist agenda: to prove that institutions
have a signi￿cant effect on state behavior.While structuring the debate in this man-
ner may have stimulated direct theoretical confrontation, it has also obscured some
important and tractable research paths. Allowing realism to set the research agenda
has meant that models of international institutions have rarely taken domestic poli-
64. One could make a similar argument about domestic theories of delegation. See Epstein and
O’Halloran 1997;Lohmannand O’Halloran 1994;and Lupiaand McCubbins1994.The analogybetween
politicians deciding to delegate authority to bureaucrats or committees and states delegating authority to
internationalinstitutionsis strong.
742 InternationalOrganizationtics seriously, treating the state as a unit. The debate has also been reduced to a
dichotomy: either institutions matter or they do not. Insufficient attention has been
giventothemechanismsthroughwhichwemightexpectinstitutionaleffectstowork.
Institutionalists,in response to realism, have treated institutionslargely as indepen-
dent variables, while playingdown earlier insights that internationalinstitutionsare
themselves the objects of strategic state choice. Treating institutions as dependent
variables has mistakenly been understood as an implicit admission that they are
epiphenomenal,with no independenteffect on patterns of behavior.65
Although it has been important to go beyond merely explaining the existence of
internationalinstitutions,productive new lines of research emerge if we accept that
institutions are simultaneously causes and effects; that is, institutions are both the
objects of state choice and consequential. In a rationalist, equilibrium framework,
this statementis obviousand unexceptionable:states chooseand design institutions.
States do so because they face certain problems that can be resolved through institu-
tional mechanisms.They choose institutionsbecause of their intended effects. Once
constructed, institutions will constrain and shape behavior, even as they are con-
stantly challengedand reformed by their member states. In this section, we outlinea
numberof lines of research that show promise to take us beyondthe ‘‘do they matter
or don’t they’’structure of research on internationalinstitutions.
The following research agenda is ￿ rmly in the rationalist tradition.Although this
approach allows for substantial variation in patterns of preferences over outcomes,
and indeed providespredictionsaboutoutcomesbased on exogenouschangein such
preferences,it providesrelativelylittleexplanatoryleveragewithrespecttothesources
of change in such preferences. A few words on how this agenda is related to the
constructivist research program may be in order. To the degree that constructivist
approaches prove powerful at making changes in actors’ fundamental goals endog-
enous,providingrefutable hypothesesaboutthe conditionsfor such change,the con-
structivist and rationalist approaches will be complementary. Although rationalist
approaches are generally powerful for explaining how policy preferences change
when external constraints or information conditions change, alternativeapproaches,
such as constructivism, are necessary for explaining more fundamental, internal
changes in actors’ goals. However, the rationalist research program has much to
contributeeven without strong theories aboutthe reasons for changein actors’goals.
One of the core insights of theories of strategic interaction is that, regardless of
actors’speci￿c preferences, they will tend to face generic types of cooperationprob-
lems over and over again. Many situationsgive rise to incentivesto renege on deals
or to behave in time-inconsistent ways that make actors happy in the short run but
regretful in the long run. Likewise, many situationsof strategic interaction give rise
to bene￿ts from cooperation, and con￿icts over how to divide up this surplus will
plaguecooperativeefforts. Thus, considerationsof how to preventcheatingand how
to resolve distributional con￿ict, to give two prominent examples, are central to
theories of cooperation regardless of the speci￿c goals of actors. Rationalist ap-
65. Mearsheimer 1994.
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of cooperationintheface ofsuchdilemmas,even absent thekindofpreciseinforma-
tion about preferences that scholars desire. It is to such dilemmas that we now turn
our attention.
CollaborationVersus CoordinationProblems
The most productive institutionalist research agenda thus far in international rela-
tions has been the rationalist–functionalistagenda,originatingwith Keohane’s After
Hegemony and Steve Krasner’s edited volumeon internationalregimes.66 This work
was informed by a fundamentallyimportant insight,inspired by the metaphor of the
Prisoners’Dilemma (PD). Individually rational action by states could impede mutu-
ally bene￿cial cooperation. Institutions would be effective to the degree that they
allowed states to avoid short-term temptations to renege, thus realizing available
mutual bene￿ts.
Some authors, recognizing that PD was only one type of collective-actionprob-
lem, drew a distinctionbetween collaborationand coordinationproblems.67 Collabo-
ration problems,like PD, are characterizedby individualincentivesto defect and the
existence of equilibria that are not Pareto optimal. Thus, the problem states face in
this situation is ￿ nding ways to bind themselves and others in order to reach the
Pareto frontier. In contrast,coordinationgames are characterized by the existence of
multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria.The problem states face in this situation is not to
avoid temptationsto defect, but to choose among these equilibria. Such choice may
be relatively simple and resolved by identi￿cation of a focal point, if the equilibria
are not sharply differentiated from one another in terms of the distribution of ben-
e￿ ts.68 But some coordination games, like the paradigmatic Battle of the Sexes, in-
volve multiple equilibriaover which the actors have strongly divergent preferences.
Initially, most authors argued that institutionswould have little effect on patterns of
state behaviorin coordinationgames, predictingsubstantialinstitutionaleffects only
in collaboration situations. Interestingly, these arguments led both to expectations
aboutinstitutionaleffects on statebehaviorandto state incentivestodelegateauthor-
ity to institutions, consistent with the kind of equilibrium analysis we ￿ nd most
promising for future research.
As the logic of modern game theory has become more deeply integrated into
international relations theory, and as authors have recognized the limitations of the
collaboration–coordinationdistinction,we havebegunto see work thatintegratesthe
efficiency concerns associated with collaborationand the distributionalconcerns as-
sociatedwithcoordination.Krasner made aseminalcontributionto thislineof analy-
sis.69He arguedthatwhen statesareattemptingtocooperatewithoneanother,achiev-
ingefficiencygains—reachingthePareto frontier—is onlyoneof thechallengesthey
66. See Keohane 1984;and Krasner 1983b.
67. See Snidal1985a;Stein 1983;and Martin 1992b.
68. Garrett and Weingast 1993.
69. Krasner 1991.
744 InternationalOrganizationface and often not the most difficultone. Many equilibriamay exist along the Pareto
frontier, and specifying one of these as the locus of cooperation,through bargaining
and the exerciseof state power, dominatesempiricalexamples of internationalcoop-
eration.Krasner’s insightis perfectly compatiblewith the folk theorems of noncoop-
erative game theory that show that repeated play of a PD-type game gives rise to
many—in fact, in￿ nite—equilibria. Thus, repetition transforms collaboration prob-
lems into coordinationproblems. In most circumstances, states have simultaneously
to worry about reachingefficient outcomesand resolvingdistributionalcon￿ict.
Once we recognize this fact, our approach to international institutions becomes
both more complex and more closely related to traditional international relations
concerns about power and bargaining. To be effective, institutions cannot merely
resolve collaboration problems through monitoring and other informational func-
tions. They must also provide a mechanism for resolving distributionalcon￿ict. For
example, institutions may construct focal points, identifying one possible equilib-
rium as the default or ‘‘obvious’’ one, thus reducing state-to-state bargaining about
the choice of a particular pattern of outcomes. The role of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), discussed elsewhere in this article, is captured in part by this type of
constructed focal-point analysis. The Basle Banking Committee’s role in devising
international standards for prudential banking practices similarly helped to coordi-
nate national regulations where a number of plausible solutions were available.70
Where states fear that the bene￿ts of cooperation are disproportionately￿ owing to
others, institutions can provide reliable information about state behavior and the
realized bene￿ ts of cooperation to allay such fears. Trade institutionsperform many
functions; one function that could stand more analytical scrutiny is the provision of
such information about the distribution of bene￿ts among members. Another way
institutionscouldmitigatedistributionalcon￿ictisto‘‘keepaccount’’ofdealsstruck,
compromises made, and gains achieved, particularlyin complex multi-issue institu-
tions. The networks created within the supranational institutions of the European
Union, for example, provide the necessary scope for issue-linkage and institutional
memory to perform the function of assuring that all members, over time, achieve a
reasonably fair share of the bene￿ts of cooperation.71 Unless the problem of equilib-
rium selection is resolved, all the third-party monitoring in the world will not allow
for stable internationalcooperation.
Thus, a promising line of research will involvebringingdistributionalissues back
into the study of internationalinstitutions,issues that were in fact the focus of some
of the early regimes literature discussed earlier. Institutionsmay interact with distri-
butional con￿ict in a number of ways. Most simply, they re￿ ect and solidify settle-
ments of distributional con￿ict that have been established through more traditional
means.These means includethe exercise of state power, which Krasner emphasizes,
market dominance, and alternative methods of bargaining such as making trades
across issues.72 In thisperspective,institutionscan make a differenceifthey lockin a
70. Simmons1998.
71. Pollack 1997.
72. Fearon 1994a.
InternationalInstitutions 745particularequilibrium,providingstability.But rather than merely re￿ ectingpower in
an epiphenomenalfashion, as realists would have it, institutionsin this formulation
preventpotentialchallengersfrom underminingexisting patterns of cooperation,ex-
plainingwhy powerfulstatesmay choosetoinstitutionalizethesepatternsratherthan
relyingsolelyon ad hoc cooperation.
Institutionsmay also serve a less controversialsignalingfunction,therefore mini-
mizing bargainingcosts. This would be the case if institutionsconstruct focal points
or if they primarily keep account of the pattern of bene￿ ts over time, as discussed
earlier. In either case, they effectively increase path dependence. Once a particular
equilibrium is chosen, institutionslock it in. Researching the ways in which institu-
tions do this—how do they enhancepath dependence,and under what conditions?—
would be intriguing.Normative questionsalso rise to the top of the agenda once we
recognize the lock-in role of institutions. If they do in fact solidify a pattern of
cooperationpreferred by the most powerful, we should questionthe ethical status of
institutions,turningour attentionto equity,as well as efficiency,questions.
In the most traditional, state-centric terms, institutions re￿ ect and enhance state
power; in Tony Evans and Peter Wilson’s words, they are ‘‘arenas for acting out
power relations.’’73 On the other end of the spectrum, we may want to ask about
situations in which institutions play a more active role in resolving distributional
con￿ict.Perhapsinstitutionssometimesdomorethanlockinequilibriachosenthrough
the exercise of state power, having an independentpart in the selection of equilibria.
Such an argumenthas been made most clearly in the case of the ECJ. Here, Geoffrey
Garrett and Barry R. Weingast ￿ nd that there are a number of ways in which the
European Community could have realized its goal of completing the internal mar-
ket.74 The ECJ made a big differenceinthecourse of Europeanintegrationbecause it
was able to construct a focal point by choosing one of these mechanisms, that of
mutual recognition. This choice had clear distributional implications but was ac-
cepted by member states because it was a Pareto improvement over the reversion
point of failing to complete the internal market.A distinct research tradition empha-
sizes the legitimizingrole that internationalinstitutionscan play in focal-pointselec-
tion. Some scholars point out that institutionallyand legally enshrined focal points
can gain a high degree of legitimacy both internationally and domestically.75 This
legitimacy,in turn, has importantpoliticalconsequences.76
To develop a research agenda on how institutions resolve problems of multiple
equilibria and distribution, we would have to build on these insights to ask condi-
tionalquestions.When are states, particularlythe powerful, willing to turn the prob-
lem of equilibrium selection over to an institution? What kinds of institutions are
most likelyto perform thisfunctioneffectively—thosethat are strategicor those that
73. Evans and Wilson 1992.
74. Garrett and Weingast 1993. They also argue that the multiple equilibria were not sharply distin-
guished from one another in terms of efficiency and do not concentrate on distributional con￿ ict among
equilibria.They have been criticized on these points.See Burley and Mattli 1993.
75. See Franck 1990;and Peck 1996,237.
76. Claude 1966, 367.
746 InternationalOrganizationare naive; those that rely on political decision making or those that rely heavily on
relativelyindependentexpertsand/orjudicialprocesses;thosethatbroadlyre￿ ect the
membership of the institution or those that are dominated by the powerful? Under
what conditions are constructed focal points likely to gain internationalrecognition
and acceptance? Overall, bringing the traditional international relations focus on
distributionalcon￿ ictbackintothestudyofinternationalinstitutionsholdsthepoten-
tial for generating researchable questions that are both positive and normative in
nature.
InternationalInstitutionsand Domestic Politics
In allowing their agenda to be de￿ned by respondingto the realist challenge,institu-
tionalists have generally neglected the role of domestic politics. States have been
treated as rational unitary actors and assigned preferences and beliefs. This frame-
work has been productive in allowing us to outline the broad ways in which institu-
tionscanchangepatternsofbehavior. Butin privilegingthestateasan actor,we have
neglected the ways in which other actors in international politics might use institu-
tions (a central insight of earlier studies of transgovernmentalorganization)and the
ways in which the nature or interests of the state itselfare potentiallychanged by the
actions of institutions (an implication of the early neofunctionalistliterature). Here
we outline a few lines of analysis that should be fruitful for integrating domestic
politics and international institutions in a systematic manner, rather than treating
domestic politicsas a residual category of explanation.Because the lines of analysis
here have foundations in speci￿ c analytical frameworks with explicit assumptions,
applyingthem to the problem of internationalinstitutionsshouldresult in productive
research paths, rather than merely the proliferation of possible ‘‘explanatory vari-
ables’’that has characterized many attemptsto integrate domestic politics and inter-
nationalrelations.We shouldnote that bringingdomesticpoliticsback into the study
of international institutions is an agenda that should be understood as analytically
distinct from that of applying institutionalistmodels developed in the domestic set-
ting to the internationallevel,an agenda addressed elsewhere in this article.
As we will argue, one of the more fundamentalways in which internationalinsti-
tutionscan changestate behavioris by substitutingfor domesticpractices.If policies
formerly made by domesticinstitutionsare now made on the internationallevel,it is
reasonable to expect substantial changes in the patterns of world politics.Three re-
latedquestionsare centraltounderstandingtherelationsbetween domesticandinter-
nationalinstitutions.First, underwhat conditionsmight domesticactorsbe willingto
substitute international for domestic institutions? Second, are particular domestic
actors regularly advantaged by the ability to transfer policymaking authority to the
internationallevel?Third,to what extentcan internationalinstitutionaldecisionsand
rules be enforced by domesticinstitutions,and what are the implicationsfor compli-
ance?These questionsare tiedtogetherby the assumptionthatdomesticactorsinten-
tionally delegate policymaking authority to the international level when this action
furthers pursuit of their interests.
InternationalInstitutions 747Domestic institutions can at times be a barrier to the realization of bene￿ts for
society as a whole. Failures of domestic institutions can arise through a number of
mechanisms.Perhaps most obviously,domestic institutionscan be capturedby pref-
erence outliers who hold policy hostage to their demands. Recent research suggests
that thismay be the case with respect to thesettlementof territorial disputesbetween
bordering states in some regions: repeated failure to ratify border agreements in the
legislatureis one of the most importantdomesticpoliticalconditionsassociated with
the willingness of states to submit their disputes to internationalarbitration.77 More
generally,thissituationis likelyto arise when some actors, such as those lookingfor
particularisticbene￿ts, ￿ nd it easier to organize than do actors more concerned with
the welfare of the average citizen. Such is the story often told about trade policy.
Import-competingproducersand others with an interest in protectionistpoliciesmay
￿ nd it easier to organizethan those who favor free trade, a coalitionof exporters and
consumers.Thisdifferentialabilityto organizewill biaspolicyin favorofprotection,
decreasing overall welfare. Transferring the policymaking process to the interna-
tionallevel,where exporterscan see thatthey havea stakein organizationin order to
gain the openingof foreign markets, can facilitatea more evenhandedrepresentation
ofinterests.Thoseactorswho havethemost togainfrom pursuitofgeneralwelfare—
such as executiveselectedbya nationalconstituency—will show the most interestin
turning to internationalinstitutionsunder such circumstances. Judith Goldstein pro-
vides an analysis along these lines when she explains the paradox of the U.S. presi-
dent agreeing to bilateral dispute-resolution panels in the U.S.–Canada Free Trade
Act (FTA), inspiteof the fact that these panelspredictablydecidecases in a way that
tends to deny protectionto U.S. producers.78
We can identify other incentives for domestic actors to transfer policymaking to
the international level. One common problem with institutions that are under the
control of political actors is that of time-inconsistentpreferences.Although running
an unexpectedlyhigh level of in￿ationtodaymay bring immediate bene￿ts to politi-
cians up for reelection,for example, allowing monetary policy to be made by politi-
cians will introduce a welfare-decreasing in￿ationary bias to the economy. Putting
additionalconstraints on policy, for example, by joining a system of ￿ xed exchange
rates or a common currency area, can provide a mechanism to overcome this time-
inconsistency problem, as argued by proponents of a single European currency. In
general, if pursuit of gains over time involves short-term sacri￿ ces, turning to inter-
nationalinstitutionscan be an attractiveoptionfor domesticpolicymakers.
A second and related question about domestic politics is whether particularkinds
of actors will regularly see an advantage in turning to the internationallevel.At the
simplest level, it seems likely that ‘‘internationalist’’ actors—those heavily engaged
in international transactions,79 those who share the norms of internationalsociety,80
77. Simmons1998.
78. See Goldstein 1996;and Gilligan 1997.
79. Frieden 1991.
80. Sikkink1993a.
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interest in turning to the international level. This may especially be the case when
such groups or parties are consistently in a minority position in domestic politics.
Drawing on these ideas, we could begin to develop hypotheses about the kinds of
domesticinterest groupsthat will most favor transferring some authorityto theinter-
nationallevel.
Certain domestic institutional actors may also have a tendency to bene￿ t from
international-level policymaking. One such actor, which is just beginning to enter
politicalscientists’analysisof internationalinstitutions,is the judiciary.Increasingly,
internationalagreements are legal in form. Thismeans thatthey often are interpreted
by domestic courts, and that judges can use internationallaw as a basis on which to
make judgments.82 Because international law provides this particular actor with an
additionalresource by which to pursueagendas,whetherbureaucraticorideological,
we might expectthat the judiciaryin general tends to be sympatheticto international
institutions.
Overall, as we work toward more sophisticatedspeci￿ cation of the causal mecha-
nisms through which institutionscan in￿uence behavior, we will have to pay much
more attentiontodomesticpoliticsthan studiesof internationalinstitutionshavethus
far. The developmentof general theoriesofdomesticpoliticsprovidesan openingfor
systematicdevelopmentof propositionsaboutdomesticactors.We no longer need to
treat the domestic level as merely the source of state preferences, nor as a residual
category to explain anomalies or patterns of variation that cannot be explained by
internationalfactors. Instead, we can move toward genuinely interactive theories of
domesticpoliticsandinternationalinstitutions,specifyingtheconditionsunderwhich
certain actors are likely to prefer that policy be made on the internationallevel.This
focus allows us to specify conditionslikelyto lead to the delegationof policymaking
authorityto the internationallevel,some of which we have outlinedhere.
UnanticipatedConsequences
In a rationalistframework, institutionsare both the object of state choice and conse-
quential.The link that ties these two aspects of institutionstogether, and allows the
analyst to develop refutable propositions about institutions within an equilibrium
framework, is the ability of actors to anticipatethe consequencesof particular types
of institutions. For example, in the preceding discussion of domestic politics, we
assumed consistently that domestic actors were able to gauge with some degree of
accuracy the ways in which working within international institutions would affect
theirabilityto pursue their material or ideationalgoals.
The rationalist approach stands in distinction to a historical or sociological ap-
proach to institutions.83 These approachessee institutionsas more deeply rooted and
81. Young1979.
82. SeeAlter 1996;and Conforti1993.
83. See Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; and Pierson 1996b.Historical institutionalismstresses
the path-dependentnatureofinstitutions,explainingwhy apparently inefficient institutionspersist. Socio-
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many international institutions reach the same degree of ‘‘taken-for-grantedness’’
that we see in domesticpoliticsor smaller-scale social relations,it seems undeniable
that they sometimes have effects that surprise their member states. It is important to
differentiate between unintended and unanticipated effects. Effects may be antici-
pated but unintended. For example, it is generally expected that arrangements to
lower the rate of in￿ ation will lead to somewhat higher levels of unemployment.
Thus, higher unemploymentis an anticipated,although unintended,consequence of
stringent monetary policies. It is best understood as a price actors are sometimes
willing to bear to gain the bene￿ts of low in￿ation. Such unintendedbut anticipated
consequences of institutions present little challenge to a rationalist approach, since
they ￿ t neatly into a typical cost-bene￿t analysis. Genuinely unanticipated effects,
however, present a larger challenge.
Speci￿ c examplesof apparentlyunanticipatedconsequencesof internationalinsti-
tutions are not difficult to ￿ nd. States that believed that human-rights accords were
nothingbut meaninglessscraps of paper found themselvessurprised by the abilityof
transnational actors to use these commitments to force governments to change their
policies.84 In the European Community,few anticipatedthat the ECJ would have the
widespread in￿uence on policy that it has.85 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was
apparentlyquitesurprised at the resultsof agreeingto changevotingrules within the
European Community, such as the adoption of quali￿ed-majority voting, which she
accepted in the Single EuropeanAct.86
How might a rationalist approach deal with these events? One productive ap-
proach might be to attempt to specify the conditionsunder which unanticipatedcon-
sequencesare most likely.This speci￿cationwould at least allow us to suggest when
a simple rationalistmodel will provide substantialexplanatoryleverage and when it
might become necessary to integrate the insights of other schools of thought. If
unanticipatedconsequencesdominatepoliticaloutcomes,we would have to draw on
alternativesto rationalist models in a way that goes far beyond using them as a way
to specify preferencesand goals. Here, we beginspecifyingwhen unanticipatedcon-
sequencesare most likelyto confound patterns of internationalcooperation.
Inductively,it appearsthatchangesinsecondaryrules—thatis, rulesaboutrules—
are the changes most likely to work in unexpected ways. Changes in voting rules
within an institution, for example, can give rise to new coalitions and previously
suppressedexpressionsof interest,leadingto unpredictedpolicyoutcomes.Changes
in decision-making procedures can have even more widespread and unexpected ef-
fects if they open the policy process to input from new actors. Many examples of
unanticipatedconsequencesarise from decision-makingprocedures that provide ac-
cess to nongovernmental and transnational actors, as, for example, Kathryn Sik-
logical institutionalism emphasizes the social nature of institutions, stressing their role in de￿ning indi-
viduals’identities and the fact that many important institutionscome to be taken forgranted and therefore
not seen as susceptible to reform.
84. Sikkink1993a.
85. Burley and Mattli 1993.
86. Moravcsik 1991.
750 InternationalOrganizationkink’s work has shown.87 Both as sources of new information and as strategicactors
in their own right, such groups are often able to use new points of access to gain
unexpected leverage over policy. Changes in decision-makingrules will have wide-
spread effects on a variety of substantive rules and are thus more likely to have
unanticipated effects on outcomes than changes in substantive rules themselves. If
this observationis correct, we should see more unanticipatedconsequencesin situa-
tions that have relativelycomplexand permutablesecondaryrules, such as legalized
institutions. Traditional state-to-state bargaining with a unit veto, which has little
secondaryrule structure,shouldprovideless opportunityfor nonstateactorsor coali-
tions of the weak to in￿uence outcomesunexpectedly.
One questionthat often arises, especiallyintheinternationalarena,is why govern-
ments are willing to live with unanticipated outcomes. After all, participation in
international institutions is voluntary. If unpleasant and unexpected outcomes fre-
quently occur, states as sovereign actors retain the right to pull out of institutions.
Why mighttheychoosetoremainin?The trivialansweris thatthebene￿tsofremain-
ing in are greater than the costs. But we can turn this answer into something non-
trivial by thinking about the conditions when institutional membership is likely to
provide the greatest bene￿ts. Some of these have been spelled out in functionalist
theory.Keohane argues that the demand for internationalinstitutionswill be greatest
under conditions of interdependence,when states face a dense network of relations
with one another and where information is somewhat scarce.88 We could generalize
that states are least likely to be willing to withdraw from an institutionin the face of
unanticipatedconsequenceswhen they are dealingwithissuesthatexhibitincreasing
returns to scale, which, in turn, create conditions of path dependence. Consider the
creation of regional trading arrangements in the 1990s. These arrangements provide
their members with economic bene￿ ts, and those on the outside of the arrangements
￿ nd themselves losing investment and trading opportunities.We therefore see east-
ern European, Caribbean, and other states clamoring to become members of the
relevant regional trading arrangements. This is a good example of how increasing
returns to scale create a highdemand for institutionalmembership.Under these con-
ditions,it seems likely that these states will be willing to put up with a high level of
unexpected outcomes before they would seriously consider withdrawing from an
institution.However, thisexamplebegsthequestionofwhethertradeagreementsare
likely to have substantial unanticipated effects. They are only likely to do so in the
case of rapid technological change or large international economic shocks, such as
the oil shocksof the 1970s.
Typology of InstitutionalEffects
As we turn our attention to the problem of how, not just whether, internationalinsti-
tutions matter, it becomes essential to understand alternative mechanisms through
which institutionsmight exert their effects. To prod our thinkingin this direction,we
87. Sikkink1993a.
88. Keohane 1983a.
InternationalInstitutions 751introduce a preliminary typology of institutionaleffects. The reasoning behind this
typology is that different institutions,or perhaps similar institutionsin different set-
tings,will have different typesof effects. Specifying theseeffects will not onlyallow
us to develop better insights into the causal mechanisms underlying the interaction
between institutions and states or societies. It will also provide for more testable
propositions about how and when we should expect institutionsto exert substantial
effects on behavior.
The typology we suggest is analytically informed but aims ￿ rst to provide a lan-
guagefor describingpatternsof changein state behaviorafter creationof an interna-
tional institution. Here we spell out the typology and present some illustrative ex-
amples.The nextstepwill be tolinkthetypologyto causalprocesses,andwe suggest
some preliminary ideas alongthese lines. We begin by suggestingtwo types of insti-
tutionaleffects: convergenceanddivergenceeffects. Of course,the nullhypothesisis
that institutionshave no effect. Developmentof a clearer analytical framework may
force us to consider situations in which we combine effects: for example, perhaps
some types of states are subject to convergence effects and others to divergence
effects.
We begin with convergenceeffects, since the logic of most rationalist, economis-
tic, and functionalist theories of international institutions leads us to expect such
effects. These models posit goals that states ￿ nd it difficult to achieve on their own,
whetherforreasonsoftime-inconsistentpreferences,collective-actionproblems,old-
fashioned domestic political stalemate, or other failures of unilateral state action. In
this functionalistlogic, states turn to international institutionsto resolve such prob-
lems; institutions allow them to achieve bene￿ts unavailable through unilateral ac-
tion of existing state structures. Functionalistanalysis sees internationalinstitutions
as important because they help states to solve problems. Many of these problems
have their roots in the failures of domestic institutions,and their resolution involves
turning some types of authority over to the international level. Once policy is del-
egated to an international institution, state behavior will converge: members will
tend to adoptsimilarmonetary,trade, or defense policies.
What has been missing from functionalist accounts of institutionalization is the
systematic connection between domestic political conditions and incentives to con-
struct and complywith internationalinstitutions.But oncewe recognizethatinterna-
tional institutionsmay make a difference because they effectively substitute for do-
mestic practices (making policy decisions, setting policy goals, or undertaking
monitoring activities), our attention turns to the domestic political conditions that
make such substitution a reasonable policy alternative. If domestic institutions are
the source of persistent policy failure, if they somehow prevent the realization of
societalpreferences,or ifthey interfere with thepursuitofmutualbene￿ts with other
states, turning functions over to the international level can enhance national wel-
fare.89 Monetary policy is a prime example of this logic. Other examples might
89. Some would argue that this process is antidemocratic. See Vaubel 1986. However, such an argu-
ment rests on weak foundations.First, it assumes that domestic institutionsare necessarily responsive to
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ists; or environmental policy, if domestic institutions encourage a short-term rather
than a long-termperspectiveontheproblem.Thinkingaboutthelogicof substitution
requires much more attention to inefficient domestic politics than most functional
theories have provided to date.
A classic example of international institutions acting as substitutes for domestic
institutions and therefore having convergence effects lies in arguments about why
high-in￿ationstatessuchasItalymightchoosetoentertheEuropeanMonetaryUnion
(EMU).90 High in￿ation is a public bad, leading to lower overall welfare than low
in￿ation. However, the short-term bene￿ts to politicians from allowing spurts of
unanticipatedin￿ation make it difficult to achieve low rates of in￿ation unless insti-
tutionsthat set monetary policy are independentof politicalin￿uence.91 Thus, trans-
ferring authorityto an institutionthat is relatively insulated from politicalin￿uence,
and that itself has a preference for low in￿ ation,can provideoverall welfare bene￿ts
for the country. This is the logic that leads a state like Italy to take the unusual step
(for arelativelyrich,developedcountry)oftransferringacoreaspectofsovereignty—
controlover the currency—to a EuropeanCentral Bank.
Given thislogicof delegation,statesthatbecome members ofthe EMU shouldsee
a convergence in their rates of in￿ation.92 Although the debate rages among econo-
mists about whether the European Monetary System has in fact worked in this man-
ner,93 there is littledoubt that one of the major motivationsfor monetary unionis for
high-in￿ation states to ‘‘import’’ low German rates of in￿ation, leading to similar
in￿ation rates in all member states. If we looked at the variation in in￿ation rates
prior to entry into monetary union (or into a monetary system more generally), and
compared it to in￿ation rates after entry, we should see a decline in the level of
variation.
Although monetary union is a prominent and intriguing example of convergence
effects, we canimaginea similardynamicinotherissueareasaswell.Environmental
institutionsshould lead to convergence of environmental indicators, such as carbon
dioxideemissions.94Human-rightsinstitutionsactingassubstitutesshouldleadmem-
bers to adopt increasingly similar human-rights practices. Even if full convergence
doesnotoccur,themajoreffect of an institutionthatisactingasa substitutewill be to
bring state practices more closely in line with one another.
A convergence effect could be measured and identi￿ed by decreased variation in
relevant indicators of state practices, whether in￿ation rates, pollution, or human-
national preferences. For the kinds of reasons just discussed, such as time-inconsistent preferences, or
institutionalcapture, this assumption is often false. Second, the argument assumes that internationalinsti-
tutions are necessarily more difficult to monitor, constrain, and in￿ uence than domestic institutions. Al-
though this may be a reasonable assumption for some kinds of societal actors and some states, it is not
universallytrue.
90. For a contrastingargument on the logicof EMU, see Gruber 1996.
91. Rogoff1985.
92. Fratianni and vonHagen 1992.
93. See Giavazzi and Giovannini1989;and Weber 1991.
94. Levy 1993.
InternationalInstitutions 753rights abuses. The existence of a convergenceeffect could also be identi￿ed through
graphicalmeans.Figure1 givesan example.On thex-axis,statesare arrayedin order
of their performance on the outcome dimension, say in￿ation rates. These rates are
indicated on the y-axis. The solid line indicates in￿ation rates prior to entry into
monetary union. Its steep slope indicates that the states exhibit substantial variation
in in￿ationrates. The dottedline represents the outcomeof monetary unionactingas
substitute, causing convergence in in￿ation rates. The more shallow slope indicates
less variationthan observedbefore entry into monetary union.
The notionthat internationalinstitutionsmightsubstitutefor domesticonesunder-
lies functionalist theories of institutions. However, some empirical work on the ef-
fects of institutionshas found a pattern quite different from the convergence of out-
comes predicted by such a mechanism. Instead, some authors have found that the
primary effect of institutions is to exaggerate preexisting patterns of behavior. For
example, Andrew Moravcsik has found, in a regional comparison of human-rights
institutions, that these institutions only led to an improvement in practices in those
states that already exhibited a high level of respect for human rights.95 Thus, West
European states, through participation in institutions, have improved their already
very good human-rights records, whereas Latin American states, according to his
evidence,show littleimpact of institutionalparticipation.
This pattern suggests that internationalinstitutionssometimes lead to divergence
of state practices, in effect complementing and magnifying preexisting tendencies
rather than overriding them. In this case, institutions will have a divergence effect.
Thiseffect resultswhen stateswhose initialpracticefalls far from institutionalguide-
lines will show little change from behavior, whereas those near the guidelinesmove
95. Moravcsik 1995.
FIGURE 1. Internationalinstitutionswith convergenceor divergenceeffects
754 InternationalOrganizationeven closerto them.In contrast,a convergenceeffect appears when institutionsexert
their greatest in￿uence on precisely those states whose behavior deviates substan-
tially from institutionalnorms. Divergence is likely to emerge when institutionsex-
aggeratedomesticallygeneratedtendenciesof state behavioror when they primarily
mimic domesticinstitutions.Anne-MarieSlaughterhas arguedsomethingalongthese
lines in pointingout that liberal states are the ones most likelyto create and abide by
relatively liberal international institutions.96 According to this logic, liberal institu-
tions will changethebehaviorof liberalstatesbutnot illiberalones, leadingto diver-
gence of state behavior.
Adivergenceeffect means that those states that already come close to institutional
norms will move further toward them, whereas the behavior of those that deviate
from such norms will remain unchanged. If we were to develop a measure of state
behavior, we would see a divergence effect in increased variation of state behavior
after institutionalcreation.We can also illustratedivergenceeffects graphically,as in
Figure 1. Here, institutionaleffects result in a steeper line, indicating greater diver-
gence in the relevant outcome variable. For ease of comparison, we continueto use
the EMU-in￿ ation example. Although such an outcome seems unlikely in practice,
for the sake of argument we could imagine that monetary union that allowed for
decentralized, unconstrained ￿ scal policymaking while providing additional re-
sources to cover national debts could lead to such a perverse outcome. Another,
perhaps more plausible, example of a divergence effect is in the area of overseas
developmentaid. In the 1970s, OECD countriesagreed to devotea set percentageof
their GDP, 0.7 percent, to development assistance. Although some countries have
come closetoprovidingthislevelofaidand usethetarget￿ gureas a toolindomestic
debates, others have wholly neglected this target and instead decreased the percent-
age of theirnationalincome that they devoteto foreign aid.
If this typology provides a useful way to describe alternative institutionaleffects,
the next challenge is to begin to link up these patterns of behavior to alternative
causalmechanisms.Thisprojectappearspromising,andwe outlinepreliminaryideas
here.As suggested earlier, institutionsthat lead to convergenceof state behaviorlink
up nicely to the functionalist approach that has dominated studies of international
institutions, regimes, and organizations over the last ￿ fteen years. In this situation,
the failure of domestic institutionsor of unilateral state action creates incentives to
rely on internationalmechanisms.The kindsof problems thatwould prompt statesto
use internationalinstitutionsthat lead to convergenceof behavior are relatively well
understood.Theyincludetime-inconsistencyproblemsthatcreateincentivesforstates
to bind themselves and collective-action problems among states or within polities.
When states turn to international institutions as the result of such problems, and
when these institutions are operating as intended, we would expect to see conver-
gence of state behavior.
The conditionsthat would prompt states to use institutionsthat lead to divergence
of behavior are not as well understood. We can begin by noting that states facing
96. Slaughter1995.
InternationalInstitutions 755collective-actionproblems, such as a PD or a coordinationgame, would be unlikely
torely onan institutionthatexaggerateddifferencesinstatebehavior.The fundamen-
tal problem in such cases is to create incentives for states to adopt similar policies:
free trade, stringent ￿ scal policies, arms control, and so on.97 In such a situation,an
institution that led to increased divergence of state practice would quickly become
irrelevantas statesignoredits constraints.Thus,oneinitialexpectationis thatinstitu-
tions should not lead to divergence in situations where incentives exist to adopt
similar policies,as when strong externalitiesto divergentor unilateralstate behavior
exist.Perhaps thishelpsus understandwhy we appearto see some divergenceeffects
inthehuman-rightsissuearea.Althoughhumanrightsarea matterofconcernaround
the globe, human-rights practices usually do not involve the kinds of externalities
and incentives for strategic interaction that exist in issue areas such as the environ-
ment or monetarypolicy.98
However, lack of externalitiesdoes not providea direct answer to why divergence
would occur. To understand this effect, it is likely that we need to considerdomestic
politics,returning us to an argument made earlier in this article. International agree-
ments, even those without enforcement mechanisms such as the OECD aid target,
can provide‘‘hooks’’by which interest groups that favor the internationalagreement
can increase their in￿uence on the domestic agenda. For example, in Scandinavian
countries the OECD target has become a potent arguing point in parliamentary de-
bates. In states without a well-organized group to grab onto this hook, or in those
with a more closed political process, agreements without enforcement mechanisms
or substantial pressure from other states to comply are unlikely to have any effect.
These contrastingdomesticpoliticaldynamicsare likelyto give rise to divergenceof
state behavioramong members of the institution.
A rationalistresearch agenda for the study of internationalinstitutionsis rich and
promising. This agenda begins by recognizing that, in equilibrium, institutions are
both causes and effects, and that empirical researchers must begin to consider the
questionof how institutionsmatter, not just whetherthey do.Thinkingin theseterms
turns our attention to the problem of how institutionsmight resolve bargaining and
distributionalcon￿ict as well as the more recognized problems of cheating.It forces
us to differentiate anticipated from unanticipated effects of institutions and to ask
about the conditions under which unanticipated effects are most likely. Rationalist
theories provide a mechanism for bringing domestic politics more systematically
into the study of internationalinstitutions,an area of research that has been slighted
by the development of the ￿ eld thus far. Finally, a rationalist approach allows us to
97. There may be some coordination situations, for example, some discussed by Simmons, in which
the solutiontothecoordinationproblemdoesnotinvolveadoptionofsimilarpoliciesbyall states butclear
division of responsibilities among states. See Simmons 1994. The Bretton Woods systems, for example,
coordinated state behavior by creating expectations that the United States would behave differently from
other members of the system.
98. Donnellysurveysthelandscape of human rightsregimes. See Donnelly1986.There may be excep-
tions to the generalization that internationalstrategic interaction on human rightsis minimal, forexample,
when severe human-rightsabuses lead to massive refugee ￿ ows. This kind of logic could lead to testable
propositions within the issue area, for example, that institutions should function differently when such
externalities exist than under ‘‘normal’’circumstances.
756 InternationalOrganizationbegin differentiating between different types of institutional effects and developing
refutable propositions about the conditions under which we are most likely to ob-
serve such effects.
Conclusions
Studiesofinternationalinstitutionshavevaried in theirtheoreticalsophisticationand
frequency over time but have remained a staple of international relations research
and the pages of IO over the last ￿ fty years. In this article we have examined the
development of these studies and outlined some promising directions for future re-
search on international institutions. Early studies of institutions were very much
problem-driven, focusing on the problems of the postwar world that some hoped
internationalorganizationscould solve.Althoughon balance realistic and insightful,
the results of these studiesfailed to cumulate,likely due to the lack of a disciplinary
or theoretical framework in which to situate the studies.A more scienti￿c approach
showed itself in a newer wave of work on institutions, drawing on methods and
modelsofAmerican politics.But becausethesemodels were in general poorlysuited
to the realities of international politics, they failed to generate substantial new in-
sights. It was not until the 1980s, with the development of work on international
regimesandfunctionalisttheories,thata moreprogressiveresearch programoninsti-
tutionsarose.
One failingofthecurrent research program,however,hasbeenitsintensefocus on
proving that institutions matter, without sufficient attention to constructing well-
delineated causal mechanisms or explaining variation in institutional effects. We
consider two approaches that might move research beyond this impasse. First, we
ask whether applying recent models of domestic politics might be more successful
than have past attempts. We ￿ nd scope for optimism here, since modern theories of
domestic institutionstypicallydraw on similar assumptions of unenforceableagree-
mentsandopportunisticbehaviorby individualsthatcharacterizemost work ininter-
nationalrelations.Finally, we turn to some more speci￿c research directions that are
likely to give rise to important and testablepropositions.These include more careful
consideration of distributional issues, the role of domestic politics, unanticipated
consequences,and a typologyof institutionaleffects.
As we consider international institutions as both objects of strategic choice and
consequential,allowing them to serve as both dependent and independentvariables
in our models, the potential for increasing our understanding of institutions and of
international politics in general is substantial, as preliminary empirical work has
begun to show. The earliest work on internationalinstitutionsproduced insightsthat
failed to add up to much because of the lack of an analyticalframework in which to
situate these insights; the next generation of work had the bene￿ t of such a frame-
work, but one that was poorly suited to the task at hand. In this article, we hope to
have identi￿ed lines of research that will combine the best of both worlds: theoreti-
cally grounded research on institutionsthat draws on assumptionsthat are appropri-
ate for the persistentproblems of internationalrelations.
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